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Abstract 
Dedebit Credit  and  Saving  Institution  (DECSI)  is  a  microfinance  institution,  which  is  engaged  in 
development activities in Tigray regional state, Ethiopia. DECSI mainly provides credit services to low income 
people who are capable to work in income generating activities. Its corporate objective is to  promote  micro  and  
small  enterprise  to  alleviate  poverty  and  unemployment.  However, the institution has been facing increase in 
loan default rate from time to time on group owned MSEs for the past five years. Thus, the aim of this study was 
to  identify  and  analyze  the association of loan repayment with the factors that  influence  group  loan 
repayment performance of the clients of DECSI operating  in  the service sector  as  group  owned  MSEs. This 
study applied explanatory research approach, cross-sectional primary data, stratified sampling techniques, and 
finally employed chi-square test to test the association of the independent variables and loan repayment 
performance. A total of eleven explanatory variables were included in the chi-square. According to the chi-
square test, group formation (screening), peer monitoring, loan size, loan term and supervision have significant 
association with loan repayment performance. Therefore, DECSI, among others, should encourage self-screened 
group borrowers, revise loan term by considering the time required for the service sector to generate income, 
regular supervision for borrowers should be in place, and set loan size based on business scope to increase loan 
repayment performance of the clients.  
Keywords: Chi-square, DECSI, Ethiopia, Factors, Group Loan, Mekelle, MFIs, MSEs, Service Sector. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most microfinance institutions provide collateral-free small loans to low income households. These loans are 
generally expected to use for self-employment and income generating activities (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). 
Microfinance can be a critical element of an effective poverty reduction strategy (Wolday, 2000).  
Microfinance institution has grown in prominence since Mohammad Yunus started the Grameen Bank 
project in 1976. The Grameen bank of Bangladesh, which was founded by Mohammed Yunus, was one of the 
first microfinance institutions (MFIs). Mohammad Yunus came up on a group of villagers that were unable to 
pay off their debt to money lenders. He found that he was able to lend them what they needed out of pocket. He 
started lending services that avoid high interest rate that the traditional money lenders charged (Cabraal, 2006).  
The development of microfinance institutions in Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon. The proclamation, 
which provides for the establishment of microfinance institutions, was issued in July 1996.  Since  then,  various  
microfinance institutions  have  legally been  registered  and  started delivering microfinance  services  (Wolday, 
2000).  
DECSI evolved from a program established by the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a local NGO 
founded in 1978. In 1993, REST conducted a socio-economic study on rural poverty in Tigray that indicated an 
unmet demand for finance by the rural poor. Based on this study, the Rural Credit Scheme in Tigray (RCST) was 
established under REST. Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI) was established and registered in 1997 
as a microfinance institution (MFI) providing credit and savings services for the rural and urban poor in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia. It is one of the most famous MFIs in Ethiopia (Temesgen, 2014). 
There are eleven types of loan (products) in DECSI. The size and loan period varies depending on the 
type of loan. Loan is provided either in group guarantee, individual with third party guarantee or through 
collateral. The Major types of DECSI’s loan are regular loan, agricultural loan, civil servant loan, rural package 
(household centered) loan, urban package loan, business loan, housing loan, loan for graduates of technical and 
vocational education training, loan for university and college graduates, equipment leasing and cooperatives. 
There are many Micro and Small Enterprises in Tigray (MSEs). The most common MSEs financed by DECSI 
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are manufacturing, services and agriculture (Temesgen, 2014).  
An extensive  effort  to  reduce  unemployment  in  the  city  of  Mekelle  is  going  on  by  the 
government through organizing those unemployed communities by assuming it is not an option rather it is very 
essential. Government is taking major role on how those organized peoples can access to loan from Dedebit 
Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) microfinance institution.  
Microfinance plays vital role in poverty reduction in developing countries. Loans taken from lending 
institutions vary from country to country, region to region and sector to sector. But most of MFIs in developing 
countries share the one common characteristic that is suffer from a considerable default rate (Kashuliza, 1993).  
Due to this reason, a study is needed in order to identify the determinant factors of group loan repayment 
performance. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Microfinance is defined as the attempt to improve access to small deposits and small loans for poor households 
neglected by banks or is defined as the provision of financial services to the poor involving small deposits and 
loans and use peer monitoring and joint liability structure to overcome the screening, monitoring and 
enforcement problems commonly encountered by formal lending institutions (Schreiner & Colombet, 2001).  
Microfinance  can  be also defined  as  financial  instruments,  such  as  loans,  savings,  insurance  and  
other financial products that are tailored only to the poor. Microfinance is created in the economy for the 
economic benefit of the poor and to alleviate poverty. Microcredit is the lending side of microfinance. 
Microcredit  loans  help  the  poor  to  be  involved  in  income  generating  activities  that  allow  them  to 
accumulate capital and improve their standard of living (Hanim, Gilbert, & Gan, 2007). 
Since 1970s, group lending programs have been promoted in many developing countries. The key 
feature of group lending is joint liability. This means all group members are treated as being in default if any one 
member of the group does not repay his/her loan. Therefore, each member is made responsible for repayment of 
loans of his or her peers (Besley & Coate, 1995). Most schemes give subsequent credit only if the group has 
fully repaid its previous loan. Loan under joint liability shows the threat of losing access to future credit incites 
members to perform various functions, including screening of loan applicants, monitoring the individual 
borrower’s efforts, and enforcing repayment of their peers’ loans (Zeller, 1996).  
In analyzing Joint Liability Lending Institutions (JLLIs), economists have agreed that joint liability 
alleviates the four main problems (i.e., adverse selection, moral hazard, costly audits and enforcement) faced by 
formal credit institutions that lend to poor borrowers who cannot offer much in the way of collateral (Ghatak & 
Guinnane, 1999).  
 
2.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE IN ETHIOPIA 
Retta (2000) has examined loan repayment performance of group borrowers in Addis Ababa. His finding was 
frequency of loan, supervision, suitability of repayment period and other income sources are found to encourage 
repayment hence reduce the probability of loan default.  
Abreham (2002) carried a study on the loan repayment and its determinants in small-scale enterprise 
financing in Ethiopia around Zeway area. His finding was education and work experience related economic 
activities before the loan are enhancing loan repayment. While extended loan repayment period influence the 
repayment performance negatively. In terms of gender composition 12.7% are females while the rest 87.3% are 
male borrowers. The mean loan-rationing ratio is larger for males while the mean loan recovery rate is less than 
female borrowers. The proportion of defaulters is 61.5% for females and 69.7% for males. Female borrowers are 
better payers relative to males. This supports the hypothesis that females feel more responsibility for their family 
than males. 
Jemal (2003) analyzed the microfinance repayment performance of Oromia Credit and Saving 
Institution (OCSI) in Kuyu, Ethiopia. According to his finding, gender, loan size and number of dependants are 
negatively related to loan repayment. On the other hand, age was found to be positive. Income from activities 
financed by loan, repayment period suitability and loan supervision are positively and significantly related to 
loan repayment performance. Moreover, loan diversion is significant and negatively related to loan repayment 
rate. The negative sign implies that the use of diverted funds for non-income generating purposes. 
Berhanu (2005) studied the determinants of loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers in 
North Gondar, Ethiopia. His finding revealed that experience and numbers of contacts were found to 
significantly influence the repayment performance. But, loan amount was found to have insignificant effect on 
loan repayment performance.  
Fikirte (2011) conducted a study on the determinants of loan repayment performance in Addis Credit 
and Saving Institution (ACSI). She found that age has significant positive effect on the loan repayment 
performance which means as age increased; the probability of being defaulter is decreased. This implies that the 
borrowers are more aware on financial management and they feel responsibility as they get elder but education 
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and business experiences had no significant effect on the probability of being defaulter. In the group lending 
female borrowers have performed worse loan repayment performance than male. Moreover, the percentage of 
female defaulters was higher than non-defaulter. 
Zelalem, Hassen, and Jema (2013) studied the determinants of loan repayment performance 
considering 14 explanatory variables. Among these, business experience was found to significantly influence the 
probability of being non-defaulter. The remaining variables like age, loan size and educational level were found 
to have no significant effect on the loan recovery rate. 
Million, Nyikal, and Wania (2012) conducted a study on the factors affecting loan repayment 
performance. They found that education is an important determinant of loan repayment. An educated client  is 
able to use modern technologies,  perform  farming  activities  based  on  cropping  calendar,  and  manage  
resources  properly.  All these factors boost production, which improves loan repayment.  
To summarize, training, repayment period experience and loan size are found to have positive impact 
on repayment performance, but some studies commented that repayment period and loan size have negative 
effect on the repayment rate, and other studies contended that loan size and experience have no significant effect 
on loan repayment performance. These show that the empirical evidences portrayed differences in their findings. 
 
2.2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Godquin (2004) tested the explanatory power of models that attribute the performances of MFIs in terms of 
repayment rate to the use of group lending, social intermediation and dynamic incentives. Age, loan size, and 
duration showed a significant negative impact on the repayment rate but social ties and professional training of 
the borrower have expected positive impact on the repayment performance. According to the theory of dynamic 
incentives, repayment performance increased as loan size increases. The size of the loan showed expected 
negative sign and is significant in the specifications as in the study by Sharma and Zeller (1997). This negative 
sign is theoretically explained by the fact that the loan size increases the gain associated with ex-ante and ex-post 
moral hazard. The negative sign of the loan size of the loan could also be linked to the borrower’s difficulty in 
repaying a larger amount over a given period (usually one year). It could be that, for a given duration, large loans 
do not meet the borrower’s needs and are not suited to the local economy. This statement is related to the 
positive and significant sign of the duration of the loan throughout the specifications. Social ties inside the group 
had a significant and unexpected negative impact on the repayment rate. The coefficient of the age of the 
borrowing group at the due date has a positive and significant coefficient but female borrowers did not prove to 
have a significantly better repayment performance. Even though the coefficient is positive, it is not significant. It 
is indeed expected that the social ties and other benefits of the group, such as information-sharing, increase with 
the age of the group. As previously mentioned, however, the age of the group has a negative impact on 
repayment performance. If MFIs want to allocate larger loans to group members with whom they have an 
established relationship, they should also develop specific incentives for their experienced borrowers to have a 
better repayment performance. 
Natukunda (2010) described micro finance credit lending terms and repayment performance and stated 
the  loan  sizes  in  most  cases  affect  the  nature  of  business  and  type  of  investment  for  the borrowers. The 
small loan size is often advanced by the micro finance institutions as a way of minimizing risks.  However,  
when  the clients  are  not  given  adequate  funds  to cater  for  their business needs, they tend to   resort to 
multiple borrowing. This in turn affects their repayment and increases the risks of the loan. The respondents 
were divided as to whether Brac Uganda is giving them enough credit to cater for their business needs with some 
indicating that it was enough while others indicated that it was not. This is in line with the findings by George 
(2008) who indicated that sometimes the loans issued by MFIs are too small to make an impact on women’s 
businesses. The perception of the respondents as to whether the loan period given by Brac Uganda is appropriate 
to their business needs indicated that members were satisfied with the loan period of five months. This concurs 
with Woolcock (2008), who argued that a long loan period may make the client to be extravagant and end up 
failing to pay back the loan. Clients taking small loans should not be given very long repayment period. From the 
research findings since the majority of the clients were dealing in small businesses and taking small loans, they 
need a short loan period for regular recapitalization. 
Zeller (1996) analyzed the determinants of repayment performance of credit groups in Madagascar.  
His finding is groups with higher level of social cohesion have a better repayment rate. Moreover, the programs 
that provide saving service to their members have a significantly higher repayment rate. This result emphasizes 
the role of saving services for improving the performance of group credit programs. He also identified that with 
larger group size, the repayment performance improves.  This result is in line with the hypothesized economies 
of scale, scope, and risk.  However, it is to be noted that groups will have increasing costs of coordination, moral 
hazard, and free-rider problems when group size surpasses manageable levels.  The optimal group size will vary 
with respect to socioeconomic and agro ecological conditions of the participating communities and with program 
characteristics. 
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Zeller (1996) assessed repayment performance in group-based credit programs in Bangladesh. Their 
hypothesis was that the bigger the group, the more imperfect are flows of information likely to be between 
members. Hence, problems arising out of asymmetric information make monitoring and enforcing costly and 
less effective.  Rates of default are therefore expected to increase with group size (+). The sign of the coefficient 
is positive as expected; however, it is marginally insignificant at the 10-percent level. They found that the greater 
the loan size, the greater the probability of the default (+). 
As per empirical analysis on determinants of repayment performance in credit groups by Zeller (1998) 
implementation of internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better  repayment  
performance  that  is  decrement  in  the  cost  of  operations  of  the  lender  and decrement in the default rate. 
 Olagunju and Adeyemo (2007) have analyzed the determinants of repayment decision among small 
holder farmers in Southwestern State of Nigeria. The result showed that the number of visits made by loan 
officers to the borrowers, higher level of education, and time of loan disbursement would have a better 
repayment performance. Moreover, borrowers with lower number of household members would meet their 
repayment obligation better than those with high number of household members. And having access to business 
related information and providing training to the clients are increasing the loan repayment rate of the borrowers.  
Woolcock (2008) observed that if the loan term is too short, the borrower fails to generate revenue to  
enable  him/her  make  repayments  while  a  longer  loan  term  may  make  the  client  extravagant  and  the 
client  may  in  the  end  fail  to  pay  back.  For successful results, the loan terms should match the cash patterns 
to help the client budget cash flows. He  also argued  that  if physical  collateral  were  a  requirement  for  
borrowing,  most  MFIs  clientele  would  be  unable  to participate due to their extreme poverty levels. Since 
borrowers do not have physical collateral, MFIs focus on using social collateral via group lending.  Group 
lending encompasses a variety of methodologies, but all are based on the principle of joint liability.  In essence, 
the group  takes  over  the  underwriting,  monitoring,  and  enforcement  of  loan  contracts  from  the  lending 
institution. 
Goldmark (2001) indicated that under  joint  liability  each  group  member  is  made  responsible  for  
the loan of other group members. If one defaults, the other group members are required to cover the loan from  
their  own  resources,  and  if  they  do  not,  they  lose  access  to  future  loans.  It is thus in each member’s 
interest to ensure that the other members pay.   
George (2008) argued that a large majority of the micro finance institutions were offering very short 
loan repayment periods without grace periods, thus straining and pressuring them to make quick repayments. 
The clients did not feel the immediate impact of the loan but instead they felt immense pressure to put all their 
earnings towards loan repayment. He further indicated that the immense pressure associated with quick loan 
repayment and short grace period could have led some micro entrepreneurs to sell their land in order to meet the 
demand for quick repayments. 
Hanim et al.(2007) reported that the probability of a loan repayment problem was higher for borrowers 
who repaid their loans on a weekly basis. As hypothesized, a weekly loan repayment schedule posed problems 
for borrowers who generated a lower revenue cycle. They have also revealed that age was positive and 
significant. Borrowers in the 46 to 55 age group had a higher probability of having repayment problems. This 
finding contradicted with the hypothesis that older borrowers were more responsible in repaying their loans than 
younger borrowers. This could be because the borrowers in this age group might have higher financial 
commitments to their family and business expenses. Thus, with higher financial obligations, they could have 
difficulty in repaying their loans. Borrowers aged between 18 and 25 years old had a higher probability of having 
a problem in repaying their loans.  The  age  group  18  to  25  years  old  is  the  youngest  group  among 
borrowers.  This finding supports the argument that older borrowers would be more responsible and disciplined 
in repaying their loans than younger borrowers. Lack of experience in the business involved, which resulted in 
less income received, might be the reason that the younger group has difficulty in repaying the loan. In addition, 
younger borrowers are not committed to repaying their loan because they might believe that  even  if  they  
default;  they  still  can  receive  microcredit  loans  from  other  microfinance  institutions because  they have 
more opportunities  since  they  are  still  young. They found that significant positive sign on the gender variable 
indicated that the probability of a loan repayment problem was higher for males than for females. 
Onyeagocha and Chidebelu (2012) carried a study on determinant of loan repayment performance in 
Southeast State of Nigeria.  They hypothesized that loan size to have a negative relationship with repayment rate. 
In other words, the higher the loan size given by the institution, the lower was the repayment rate of the clients. 
Their regression result strongly disagreed with this hypothesis. It stipulated that the higher the size of the loan to 
clients, the higher the repayment rate.  This  situation  appears  to  be  most  unlikely  because  the amount  to  be  
repaid  was  relatively  larger  and  if  the  loan  was from development oriented institution with subsidized 
interest rate  and  little  chance  of  repeat  loans,  the  pressure  or inclination  of  such  clients  would  be  to  
delay  repayment.  
Sylvester, Okpara, and Chukwudi (2013) assessed the determinants of loan repayment performance. 
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The coefficient of age of clients was significant at 1% but negatively signed indicating that age has an inverse 
relationship with repayment rate. This may be as they get old, in that they take less risk and invest less but think 
or concentrate more on their daily consumption activities without thinking of collecting loans. Experience 
coefficient is also significant at 1% and positively signed. This means that a client with higher business 
experience stands a better chance of repaying more loan than with those of lower business experience. The 
reason for this may be attributed to improvement in managerial skill  which  makes  for  higher  profitability  
which  in  turn induces the  need for more financial resources to further enhance profitability. The educational 
level coefficient had a positive sign indicating that education has direct relationship to the repayment rate and 
this showed that as level of education increases, borrowers enhances their  ability to access, evaluate, and 
understand new production  techniques. This  underpins  the  assertion  that  educated farmers are  more 
amenable  to  risk  taking  and  change than  the  non-educated  ones.  The result of this study showed that the 
higher the literacy level of the clients, the higher will likely be non-default. 
To sum up, the empirical evidences showed that there are many factors that affect the group loan 
repayment performance positively or negatively. In most studies described that loan size, loan term, training, 
social ties, saving, experiences, peer monitoring, supervision, internal rules and regulation and group formation 
(screening) are found to positively affect group loan repayment performance; group size is found affecting 
negatively the group loan repayment performance; however, in some studies loan size  found to have negative 
impact on the repayment performance and in some other studies loan size and experiences are found to have no 
significant effect on group loan repayment performance. This shows the empirical evidences revealed that the 
impact of the factors on the loan repayment performance differs in terms of the group characteristic related 
factors, economic and institutional factors. 
 
2.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 below demonstrates the conceptual framework of the relationship between the dependent variable 
(group loan repayment performance) and the independent variables (those factors that determine loan repayment 
performance) mentioned above. 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
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3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Although the performance of the MFIs in Ethiopia has been impressive since their establishment, they are not 
free of default problems as can be observed in the following table. Hunte (1996) argued  that  default  problems  
destroy  lending  capacity  as  the  flow of repayment declines, transforming lenders into welfare  agencies,  
instead  of a viable  financial  institution. Loan default may also deny new applicants access to credit as the 
microfinance institutions management problems augment in direct proportion to the increasing default problem.  
One indicator of effective MFIs is the loan performance of the borrowers (Sengupta & Aubuchin, 2008). High 
repayment rates are associated with the benefits for both MFIs and borrowers (Godquin, 2004). If there is high 
repayment rate, the relationship between the MFIs and their clients will be good (Bond & Rai, 2009). In contrast, 
if there is low repayment rate, both the borrowers and MFIs will be adversely affected. So if the MFIs are not 
viable because of default problem, borrowers will not have access to loan and suffer from poverty, as a result 
affects the development of the country as whole.  
Figure 2 below indicated that average default rate of the borrowers for the last five years is about 16% 
which is greater than the Ethiopian National Bank (NBE) minimum requirement set  for  all  financial  
institutions,  i.e.,  <5  percent  (or  >95 percent expected to be collected). In 2009 the default rate was 18.47% 
and increased to 25% in year of 2010. Though the default rate was decreasing to 9.8% and 4% in the years of 
2011 and 2012, respectively, finally it increases to 24% in the year of 2013.  
Besides, the repayment performances of the group borrowers have been significantly fluctuating from 
time to time. Thus, whether  default  is  random  and  influenced  by  erratic  behavior  or  whether it is 
influenced by certain factors in a specific situation, needs an empirical investigation.  
Figure 2. Default Rate in the Past Five Successive Years 
 
Source: DECSI (2014) 
 
4. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of this study was to examine the association of group loan repayment with the determinant 
factors that influence group loan repayment performance of MSEs service sector in Mekelle City.  
 
5. MATERIALS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section deals with an overview of the study area and research methodology. Specifically it presents 
selection of the research methods that are used in this study: research approach; data type, source and collection 
techniques; sampling techniques; and data analysis technique. 
 
5.1. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA 
The study area is Mekelle city which is located at northern part of Ethiopia, in Tigray regional state. It is located 
at a distance of 783 kilometers from the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Mekelle is the capital city of 
Tigray regional state. It is located at latitude and longitude of 13
o
 29’N, 39
O
 28’E, respectively, with an elevation 
of 2084meters above sea level. It is a city with seven sub city administrations. Based on the study conducted in 
2010 by Mekelle municipality, the city had an estimated total population of 248,566; of which 120,830 were 
males and 127,736 were females [Mekelle City Administration (MCA), 2010]. 
DECSI is located in Mekelle city, the capital city of Tigray. When the institution commenced in 1994, 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
18.47%
25%
9.80%
4%
24%
Loan Default Rate in Percentage
Default rate
year
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it had branches in 8 Wereda of the region with only 31 employees. Today, it provides services from 165 
functionally decentralized offices all over Tigray regional state as well as Addis Ababa and Gondar. The current 
number of the staff has reached 2,727. The institution delivers major types of loan like regular loan, agricultural 
input loam, civil servant loan, rural package loan, urban package loan, business loan, housing loan, and 
cooperative loan. In general, the institution operates in rural and urban Tigray catering the poorest of the poor 
segment of the community as farmers, youth, marginalized women, disabled veterans, TVETs, graduated 
students, contractors, Micro-Small Enterprises and agro-industries. Up to now, more than 8 billion Birr loan is 
disbursed to 3,104,769 clients, out of which 25 million loans is disbursed to 512 cooperative clients (Temesgen, 
2014). 
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
5.2.1. RESEARCH APPROACH  
For a similar study, Million et al.(2012) have applied descriptive approach; Paxton (1996) has applied 
explanatory approach; and  Fikirte (2011), Jemal (2003), and  Natukunda (2010) have applied both descriptive 
and explanatory approach. Besides, all the above researchers used a cross-sectional data. Thus, this study used a 
cross-sectional data and applied explanatory approach to analyze the factors that influence group loan repayment 
performance. 
5.2.2. DATA TYPE, SOURCES, AND COLLECTION TECHNIQUE 
Fikirte (2011) and  Natukunda (2010) used primary data composed of qualitative and quantitative data collected 
through questionnaire and secondary data; and Jemal (2003) and George (2008) used primary data only 
composed of qualitative and quantitative data collected through questionnaire and interview. Therefore, in order 
to assess the determinants of group loan repayment performance, this study used primary data comprising 
quantitative data obtained by structured questionnaire from DECSI clients.   
5.2.3. SAMPLE DESIGN 
For a similar study, Fikirte (2011) and Natukunda (2010) used a stratified sampling technique to select sample 
respondents; Jemal (2003) and Godquin (2004) used simple random sampling, and George (2008) used 
multistage sampling method to select sample respondents.  
Currently DECSI Mekelle branch has three sub-branches (loan centers) but the study focused on the two sub-
branch (service delivery centers) selected based on default rate of the loan centers. The target populations of the 
two loan centers were 7 group loaners engaged in service sector consisting of 122 group members. A simplified 
formula (Yamane, 1967) was applied to determine the sample size at 90% level of significance.  
n


--------------------------------------------- (1) 
Where N = population size; e = the level of precision. 
The sample size was: 
                                 n

	.
 = n

.
 = 55. 
Therefore, the study used stratified proportionate random sampling to select the 55 sample respondents from the 
two loan centers.  
TABLE 1. DETERMINATION OF PROPORTIONATE SAMPLE SIZE 
(a) 
Sub-branch 
(b) 
Activities 
(c) 
Population in a group 
(d) =	
∗

 
Sample size 
 
 
North 
Janitor  65 29 
Car wash 10 4 
Café 4 2 
Service 18 8 
 
South 
Recreation 10 4 
Restaurant 9 4 
Internet 10 4 
                                             Total 122 55 
Source: DECSI’s North and South Branch office Report (2014) 
The sample size accounts for about 45% of the population and this implies the sample respondents 
represent the target population. 
5.2.4. METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS  
This study used the chi–square statistics for testing the association of the group loan repayment with the factors 
influencing the loan repayment performance.  
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6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents, analyzes and interprets the response gathered from the respondents through structured 
questionnaire. For this purpose, the chi-square statistics was employed to compare non-defaulter and defaulter 
groups with respect to their variables in order to analyze the association of group loan repayment with the 
explanatory variables. 
 
6.1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS  
In  this  section,  the  respondents’  demographic  characteristics  are  presented  with  particular reference to 
gender , age and education level in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Demographic Characterizes of Respondents 
Category Number Percent 
Gender: 
Male  
Female  
 
25 
25 
 
50 
50 
Total   50 100 
Age:  
18-25 
26-35 
36-45 
46+ 
 
15 
19 
8 
8 
 
30 
38 
16 
16 
Total 50 100 
Educational level: 
Secondary  
Diploma  
Degree  
 
9 
13 
28 
 
18 
26 
56 
Total  50 100 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
As indicated in Table 2 above, among the 50 respondents; 
 25(50 percent) of the respondents were female borrowers and 25(50 percent) respondents were male 
borrowers. 
 Respondents in the age category of 18-25, 26-35, 36-45 and 46+ accounts for 30 percent, 38 percent, 
16 percent and 16 percent, respectively.  
 Majority (56 percent) of the respondents have attended first degree followed by diploma holder (26 
percent). The remaining respondents (18 percent) had secondary school. 
 
6.2. RESULTS, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION  
6.2.1. STATUS OF GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT  
To know the loan repayment status, group borrowers were asked whether they have paid  back fully  and on 
repayment with arrears  (i.e., 30, 60, 180, less than 360 days  past due),  or not paid successfully  (defaulted,  i.e.,  
greater  than  360  days  past  due)  in  the  form  of  “Yes”  or  “No” response question. Such an objective 
response and direct measurement of the binary dependent variable  (i.e.,  group  loan  repayment  equal  to  “1”  
if  groups  were  non-defaulters  and  “0” otherwise)  was used to determine the  factors that affect group  loan 
repayment performance  in similar studies of Paxton (1996) and Million et al.(2012). 
Out of  the  total  respondents 28 (56 percent) were  able  to  repay  the  loan  within  the given 
maturity period, and hence they are creditworthy. Whereas the remaining 22 (44 percent) respondents have 
defaulted (i.e., greater than 360 days past due) on their loan and this implies that the borrowers are not 
creditworthy.  
The following Figure 3 shows the status of loan repayment by the group borrowers. Default  problems  
destroy  lending  capacity  as  the  flow of repayment declines, transforming lenders into welfare  agencies,  
instead  of a viable  financial  institution. Loan default may also deny new applicants access to credit because the 
micro finance institutions management problems augment in direct proportion to the increasing default problem 
(Hunte, 1996). Concerning this matter, annual reports of DECSI indicates that the loan default rate for DECSI is 
fluctuating from time to time as summarized in Figure 2 above, especially in the years of 2010 and 2013. This 
result also found 44 percent default rate. This implies that high loan default rate might threaten the financial 
sustainability of DECSI.  
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6.2.2. CHI-SQUARE TEST  
In this section, the association of the dependent variable against the explanatory variable is examined by using 
the chi-square test. Thus, the results are analyzed and discussed as follows below. 
6.2.2.1. LOAN REPAYMENT AND GROUP CHARACTERISTIC RELATED FACTORS 
Group characteristics related factors include group size, social ties, business experience, peer monitoring, group 
formation and internal rule and regulation of group borrowers. The description of these variables is provided 
below to indicate their association with group borrowers in terms of loan repayment performance. 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY GROUP SIZE AND GROUP FORMATION, AND COMPARISON OF NON 
DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS  
The following Table 3 shows the comparison of non-defaulter and defaulter groups by using group size and 
group formation. 
Table 3: Distribution of Group Borrowers by Group Size and Group Formation. 
 
 
Variables 
Loan repayment performance of respondents  
Total 
 
 
Chi
2
 
 
 
p-value 
Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Group size  
Below 6 19 67.86 12 54.54 31 62 0.9266 0.336 
6 and above 9 32.14 10 45.46 19 38 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
Group formation  
Self-
screened  
21 75 5 22.73 26 52 13.4870* 0.000 
Screened by 
other 
7 25 17 77.27 24 48 
Total  28 100 22 100 50 100   
* Significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
Table 3 above shows that borrowers who have small group size looks higher loan repayment 
performance. The survey result shows 31(62 percent) of the respondents replied that their group size is below 6 
while 19 (38 percent) respondents replied that their group size is 6 and above. 19(67.86 percent) of non-
defaulters and 12(54.54 percent) of the defaulters are below 6 in their group size. This shows the existence of a 
positive relationship/association between small group size and loan repayment performance. However, the 
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association between group size and loan repayment performance is insignificant with statistical result of Chi
2
 = 
0.9266, at p = 0.336.  
This result is in line with the finding of Zeller (1996) who assessed repayment performance in group-
based credit programs in Bangladesh. Their finding was that the bigger the group, the more imperfect are flows 
of information likely to be between members. Hence, problems arising out of asymmetric information make 
monitoring and enforcing costly and less effective.  Rates of default are, therefore, expected to increase with 
group size increases.   
Thus, the result implies that there is a difference in terms of loan repayment among these two groups 
(defaulters and non-defaulters) in terms of group size although the difference is statistically insignificant 
according to the Chi-square test statistics.  
The survey result showed that 52 percent of the sample respondents were self-screened but 48 percent 
of the respondents were screened by others. Borrowers who self-screened and non-defaulter were 21(75 percent) 
and self-screened and defaulter were 5(22.73 percent). Furthermore, when it is tested whether self-screening has 
a significant association  with  loan  repayment  of  group  borrowers,  Pearson  chi-square  value  (Chi
2
=13.4870  
at P=0.000) reveals that there is statistically significant positive association between self-screening and loan 
repayment performance.  
This result is consistent with the finding of Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) who suggested that group 
formation displays positive matching under a joint-liability contract. Screening is an important function of group 
formation, and several studies suggest the importance of practical measures in screening. Groups that directly 
screened members according to their local reputations, or that had adopted a written internal constitution, 
experienced significantly fewer problems with loan delinquency.  
Hence, this result portrays that screening and selecting of creditworthy group member is more effective 
with groups that are formed by the members themselves because the group may have relevant and adequate 
information about their member with regard to his/her work ethics and intention to work as a team. 
 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY SOCIAL TIES AND BUSINESS EXPERIENCE, AND COMPARISON OF 
NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The next Table 4 presents the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using 
social ties and business experience.                                                                                                                                                                               
Table 4: Distribution of Group Borrowers by Social Ties and Business Experience 
 
 
Variables 
Loan repayment performance of respondents  
Total 
 
 
Chi
2
 
 
 
p-value 
Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
      Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Social ties 
Have social ties 15 53.57 15 68.18 30 60  
1.0958 
 
0.295 Have no social 
ties 
13 46.43 7 31.82 20 40 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
Business experience in years 
Below 6 yrs 10 35.71 9 40.91 19 38   
0.1411 
 
0.707 6 and above yrs 18 64.29 13 59.09 31 62 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
The survey result indicated that those who have social ties are 30(60 percent) and those who have no 
social ties account 20(40 percent). 15(53.57) of non-defaulters and 15(68.18 percent) of defaulters have social 
ties. 
The above Table 4 revealed that social ties have no association with loan repayment performance. The 
association between social ties and loan repayment performance is statistically insignificant with the Chi
2 
result 
of (Chi
2
 = 1.0958, p = 0.295). This result contradicts with the study of Besley and Coate (1995) which stated that 
if social ties among members are sufficiently strong, the net effect is positive because by defaulting willfully a 
borrower incurs sanctions from both the lender and the community. 
Therefore, this study implies that the existence of social ties has no statistically significant association 
with loan repayment performance because the group may fail to put pressure on the defaulting member in order 
not to adversely affect their social relationship. 
Table 3 above illustrates that 38 percent of the respondents have below 6 years business experience but 
the other 62 percent have 6 and above business experience. 18(64.29 percent) of the non-defaulters and 13(59.09 
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percent) of the defaulters have 6 and above business experience. 
Though the survey result shows that as business experience of the borrowers increases, the probability 
to be non-defaulter increases but the association  between the business experience and loan repayment 
performance is not statistically significant with Chi
2
 value = 0.1411 and p-value = 0.707. This supports the 
finding of Fikirte (2011) which stated that business experiences had no significant effect on the probability of 
being defaulter. 
To summarize, this result implies that though there is an association between loan repayment 
performance and business experience, the association is statistically insignificant because the group may fail to 
acquire the required knowledge and skills in business management (especially in cost effective service delivery, 
marketing and financial management during their stay in business). 
 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY PEER MONITORING AND INTERNAL RULE AND REGULATION, AND 
COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The next Table 5 presents the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using peer 
monitoring, and internal rule and regulation.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Table 5: Distribution of Group Borrowers by Peer Monitoring and Internal Rule and Regulation 
 
 
Variables 
Loan repayment performance of respondents  
Total 
 
Chi
2
 
 
p-value Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
       Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Peer monitoring 
Have  
peer monitoring 
17 60.71 7 31.82 24 48  
 
4.1214** 
 
 
0.042 Have no  
Peer monitoring 
11 39.29 15 68.18 26 52 
Total  28 100 22 100 50 100   
Internal rules and regulation 
Have internal rule 
and regulation  
8 28.57 7 31.82 15 30  
 
0.0618 
 
 
0.804 Have no internal 
rule and regulation 
20 71.43 15 68.18 35 70 
Total  28 100 22 100 50 100   
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
The above Table 5 presents that 24(48 percent) of the total respondents had peer monitoring system 
but the rest 26(52 percent) had no peer monitoring system. 17(60.71 percent) of those who have peer monitoring 
are non-defaulter borrowers while 7(31.82 percent) of those who have peer monitoring are defaulters. Thus, the 
association between peer monitoring and loan repayment performance is positive and statistically significant 
(Chi
2
 = 4.1214, at p = 0.042).  
This result is in line with the finding of Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) who declared that peer 
monitoring is the act in which members are incited to exercise the appropriate effort and to allocate funds in the 
more productive ways in order to solve problem of loan default and joint liability among group members are 
important principles that can lower losses of MFIs as a loan default. Besides, it is in line with the theories of peer 
monitoring which say groups are motivated by the fact that group members have an incentive to take remedial 
action against a partner who miss-uses his/her loan because of joint liability. With group lending, individual 
borrowers are made to bear liability for themselves and for others in their group, but the savings in the form of 
better project choice allows the bank to pass on some benefits to the borrowers in the form of reduced interest 
rates (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999). Thus, group lending increases welfare and repayment rates.  
Thus, this study proves that that the existence of peer monitoring among group members proves to be 
positive and meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
As shown in Table 5 above, 15 (30%) of sample respondents have internal rule and regulation but 35 
(70%) of the sample respondents have no internal rule and regulations. 8(28.57 percent) of non-defaulter and 
7(31.82 percent) of the defaulters have internal rules and regulations. Thus, the association between internal rule 
and regulation, and loan repayment performance is not statistically significant with the chi-square value of (Chi
2
 
= 0.0618 at P=0.804).  
This result is contrary to the finding of Zeller (1998) which stated that group borrowers that have 
internal rules  and  regulations  shows  better  loan  repayment  performance  as  compared  to  those  group 
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borrowers that has no internal rules and regulations. 
Therefore, this study entails that there is no significant association between internal rules and 
regulations, and loan repayment performance because the existing internal rules and regulations may not be 
practical upon those group members who fail to fulfill their responsibilities.  
6.2.2.2. LOAN REPAYMENT AND ECONOMIC FACTOR 
There are different socio-economic factors that can affect group loan repayment. But this study took one of those 
socio-economic factors that affect group loan repayment, i.e., saving. 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY SAVING, AND COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND 
DEFAULTERS 
The following Table 6 shows the comparison of non defaulter and defaulter group borrowers by using saving. 
Table 6: Distribution of Group Borrowers by Saving 
 
Variable 
Loan repayment performance of respondents  
 
Total 
 
 
Chi
2
 
 
 
p-value 
Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Saving  
Save  14 50 9 40.91 23 46  
0.4099 
 
0.522 No save  14 50 13 59.09 27 54 
Total  28 100 22 100 50 100   
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
Regarding to saving, out of the total observation 27(55 percent) of the respondents replied that they did 
not save where as 23(46 percent) said that they have an account and save. 14(50 percent) of the non-defaulters 
and 9(40.91 percent) of the defaulter respondents replied that they exercise saving. The expectation was those 
who save were predicted to have a good loan repayment performance. It shows slight association between saving 
and loan repayment performance but statistically insignificant with the chi-square statistics (Chi
2
 = 0.4099, p = 
0.522).  
This result is against the study of Wolday (2000) who stated that saving can play a significant role in 
increasing levels of institutional sustainability and enhancing levels of outreach. Therefore, MFIs that offer 
saving facilities have a cheap source of funds for further lending to more sustainable operations. On the other 
side, voluntary saving builds the equity of poor households and protects them against unforeseen economic and 
personal crisis. Zeller (1996) also agreed with the importance of saving to influence the repayment rate. It is 
expected that saving services offered by the program improves the repayment rate of the group. Saving may 
increase the financial discipline of group members and can also serve as loan collateral. 
Thus, this study shows that there is no significant association between saving and loan repayment 
performance because the size of saving may not be as significant as the size of the loan so as to serve as loan 
collateral. In addition, the saved amount may not be for loan repayment (i.e., may be for personal consumption, 
education or any other obligations). 
6.2.2.3. LOAN REPAYMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS  
Institutional factors are factors that affect the group loan repayment. These are suitable loan repayment period 
(loan term), loan size, loan supervision and training. Their association with loan repayment performance is, thus, 
discussed below. 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY SUITABLE LOAN REPAYMENT PERIOD AND LOAN SIZE, AND 
COMPARISON OF NON DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The following Table 7 presents the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using 
suitable repayment period (loan term) and loan size.   
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Table 7: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Loan Term and Loan Size 
 
 
Variables 
Loan repayment performance of respondents  
 
Total 
 
 
Chi
2
 
 
 
p-value 
Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Loan term 
Suitable  26 92.86 8 36.36 34 68  
18.0696* 
 
0.000 
Not suitable  2 7.14 14 63.64 16 32 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
Loan size    
Sufficient  5 17.86 12 54.54 17 34  
7.3900* 
 
0.007 Not sufficient  23 82.14 10 45.46 33 66 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
* Significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
Loan terms such as the repayment period might affect the loan repayment by the borrower. In this  
study  it  is  hypothesized  that  as  suitable  loan  repayment  period  is  set  for  borrowers,  the probability  of  
loan  repayment  increases.  It means  that  group  borrowers  that  have suitable loan  repayment  period  make  
good  repayment  performance  as  compared  to  borrowers  that  have not suitable repayment period. 
As indicated in the Table 7 above, the survey result shows 34(68 percent) of the respondents believe 
that the repayment period set by DECSI is suitable. But 16(32 percent) of the respondents believe that the loan 
term set by DECSI is not suitable. 92.86 percent of the non-defaulters perceive suitable loan repayment, which is 
greater than the corresponding figure for the defaulter group borrowers (36.36 percent). 
This reveals that suitable loan repayment period is positively associated with repayment performance. 
The remaining 2(7.14 percent) non-defaulter respondents  believe  that the  repayment  period  set  by  DECSI  is  
not  suitable  in  which 14(63.34 percent) defaulter respondents  are  unable  to  settle  the  loan  as  per  the  
established  repayment schedule. Furthermore, the Pearson chi-square value (Chi
2
 = 18.0696 at P = 0.000) 
reveals that there is significant positive association between loan repayment period and loan repayment 
performance. 
This result is in line with Woolcock (2008) which stated that if the loan term is too short, the 
borrowers fail to generate revenue to  enable  them  make  repayments  while  a  longer  loan  term  may  make  
the  client  extravagant  and  the client  may  in  the  end  fail  to  pay  back.  For successful results, the loan 
terms should match the cash patterns to help the client’s cash flows. 
As presented in Table 7 above, 17(34 percent) of borrowers responded that they received sufficient 
loan from DECSI microfinance institution whereas the remaining 33(66 percent) of borrowers responded that 
they did not receive enough loan that match their intended purpose. 
Regarding to sufficiency of loan amount 5(17.86 percent) of the non-defaulters and 12(54.54 percent) 
of the defaulter respondents believe that the loan amount allowed is sufficient. Even though 5(17.86  percent) of  
non- defaulter  borrowers  responded  that  they  received  sufficient  loan  from  DECSI  microfinance institution, 
23(82.14 percent)  of  non-defaulter  borrowers responded  that  they  have not received enough  loan  that  can  
match  to their  intended  purpose.  Here majority of the borrowers perceived that the loan amount received from 
DECSI microfinance institution is not enough to accomplish their project. However, the chi-square statistical 
result (Chi
2
 = 7.3900, at p = 0.007) shows that loan repayment performance is significantly inversely associated 
with the loan size. 
This result is inconsistent with the theory of dynamic incentives said repayment performance increased 
as loan size increases (Sharma & Zeller 1997). Besides, Natukunda (2010) reported that small loan size is often 
advanced by the micro finance institutions as a way of minimizing risks.  However,  when  the clients  are  not  
given  adequate  funds  to cater  for  their business needs, they tend to resort to multiple borrowing. This in turn 
affects their repayment and increases the risks of the loan repayment. Besides, it contradicts with the findings of 
Onyeagocha and Chidebelu (2012) which stated that the higher the loan size given by the institution, the lower is 
the repayment rate of the clients. 
Generally, this result entails that suitable loan repayment period couple with small loan size leads to 
good loan repayment performance because an extended loan term enables borrowers’ to secure sufficient cash 
flows in order to settle installment payments of the small loan size. In addition, the negative sign of the loan size 
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may be due to the borrowers’ difficulty in repaying a larger amount over a given period and also larger amount 
may be excess to finance the proposed project and divert the excess amount to other consumption. 
 
LOAN REPAYMENT BY TRAINING AND LOAN SUPERVISION, AND COMPARISON OF NON 
DEFAULTERS AND DEFAULTERS 
The Table 8 below reveals the comparison of credit worthy and non-credit worthy group borrowers by using 
training and loan supervision.   
Table 8: Distribution of Sample Group Borrowers by Loan Training and Supervision 
 
 
Variables 
Loan repayment performance of 
respondents 
 
 
Total 
 
 
Chi
2
 
 
 
p-value Non-defaulters (28) Defaulters (22) 
Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Training 
Trained  20 71.43 14 63.64 34 68  
0.3438 
 
0.558 
Not trained  8 28.57 8 36.36 16 32 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
Supervision 
Supervised  22 78.57 8 36.36 30 60   
9.1450* 
 
0.002 Not supervised  6 21.43 14 63.64 20 40 
Total 28 100 22 100 50 100   
* Significant at 1 percent level. 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
With respect to before loan and after loan training to group borrowers from DECSI, Table 8 above 
revealed that out of the total 50 group borrowers included in this study, 34(68 percent) of them have got training 
related to saving, recording, loan utilization and the overall rules and regulation of the institution while 16(32 
percent) of group borrowers did not get training.  
As it is indicated on the above Table 8, 20(71.43 percent) of the non-defaulter respondents and 
14(63.64) of the defaulter respondents have got training. This shows that there is a positive association between 
training and loan repayment performance though the Pearson chi-square statistics (Chi
2
 = 0.3438, P = 0.558) 
shows that there is positive but statistically insignificant association. 
This is consistent with the finding of Statham (2008) which stated that one of the important 
requirements for the success of microfinance institutions is to create awareness to potential clients by giving 
appropriate training to borrowers about loan utilization, loan terms and obligations. In addition, Admassie (2005) 
agreed on the loan utilization and technical training should be given to improve the skill of potential and actual 
clients. Technical support is important to increase the productivity of borrowers. 
Thus, this study reveals that there is statistically insignificant association between training and loan 
repayment performance because the training may not be continuous, relevant, timely and not catering the 
borrowers requirement. 
With regard to supervision, most of the sample respondents 30(i.e., 60 percent) were supervised but the 
rest 20(40 percent) were not supervised. The Table 8 above indicated that 22(78.57 percent) of the non-
defaulters and 8(36.36 percent) of the defaulter borrowers were supervised. So, there is significant positive 
association between loan supervision and loan repayment performance with the statistical result (Chi
2
 = 9.1450, 
P = 0.002). This result implies that loan supervision may help borrowers get regular consultations for 
strengthening their income generating business as well as better assistance with regard to loan repayment period, 
loan size, and training.  
This result confirms the finding of Retta (2000) which stated that supervision has found to encourage 
repayment and Jemal (2003) also supported that supervision is positively and significantly related to loan 
repayment performance. 
To summarize, the chi-square result indicates that group formation, peer monitoring, loan term and 
supervision have a positive and statistically significant association with the loan repayment performance. But, 
loan size has inverse and significant association with the loan repayment performance.  
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7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
7.1. CONCLUSIONS 
The  status  of  group  loan  repayment  revealed that  about  56  percent  of group  borrowers  were  non  
defaulters  and  about 44  percent of  them  were  defaulters. This result shows that there is high default rate 
which in turn adversely affect the financial liquidity and sustainability of the DECSI.  
According to the chi-square test, the factors which had direct and statistically significant association 
with loan repayment performance are loan supervision, group formation (screening), peer monitoring, loan term; 
but loan size had inverse and statistically significant association with loan repayment performance. Moreover, 
group size, social ties, business experience in years, internal rules and regulations, saving, and training had no 
statistically significant association with loan repayment performance.  
Supervision affects the loan repayment performance positively and statistically significant, i.e., is those 
who supervised showed good performance to settle their loan because supervision may avoid the moral hazard 
problem arises when lenders are unable to ensure that customers are making the full effort required for their 
investment projects to be successful.  
Those groups who seek suitable repayment period (loan term) were found to be good performers in 
loan repayment as compared to those groups who do not found suitable repayment period. As loan term of 
DECSI extends according to the business nature, the ability of borrowers to generate cash increases which in 
turn enhances the repayment performance of the clients. So, loan term should match the cash patterns to help the 
client budget cash flows. 
Group formation based on self-selection of members showed good loan repayment performance  as  
compared  to  those  groups  initiated  by  other  than  member  themselves  (by outside agent or promoters). 
Groups that directly screened members according to their local reputations, or that had adopted a written internal 
constitution, experienced significantly fewer problems with loan delinquency. In general, screening and selecting 
of creditworthy group member is more effective with groups that are formed by the members themselves 
because they know the behavior of one another.  
Peer monitoring has a direct relationship or association with the loan repayment performance because 
peer monitoring is the act in which members are incited to exercise the appropriate effort and to allocate funds in 
the more productive ways in order to solve problem of loan default. 
However, loan size has an inverse association with loan repayment performance. This may be due to 
the borrower’s difficulty in repaying a larger amount over a given period. It could be that, for a given duration, 
large loans do not meet the borrower’s needs and are not suited to the local economy. It might be also mismatch 
of the loan size and scope of the business activities. 
 
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on conclusion of the research findings, the following recommendations are forwarded in order to reduce 
significantly loan default and make DECSI is sustainable. 
 One reason for low loan repayment by MSEs is that same loan term for all sectors and does not 
consider the nature of business. Sectors return or productive period may differ. So, DECSI 
should set the loan term accordingly.  
 The screening and selection criterion in place should be revised and DECSI should have to 
play major role directly in screening and selection of applicants according to borrowers’ 
interest that is borrowers can screen honor partner if they form themselves because they know 
one another.  
 DECSI should consider and set the repayment period based on the nature of the sector and 
expected optimal time that the sector will start generating income (grace period) and set the 
loan term. Thus, the borrowers will become successful and sustainable which in turn make 
DECSI financially sustainable.  
 DECSI should make continuous follow up and guidance to borrowers on how to use loan in 
general and pay regular visits to evaluate the loan utilization and repayment. Such continuous 
supervision 
 Makes borrowers to discharge their obligation and improve the proper utilization of 
the loan there by improving repayment performance. 
 May bridge the lack of borrowers’ business experience.  
 Also may source information and avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard which 
is the most important problems in the functioning of credit market which arises from 
imperfect information. 
 DECSI should advice its borrowers to have peer monitoring system to allocate the loan to its 
intended investment and protect against misuse of loan and check the matching of loan size 
and scope of business activities because if the loan size is greater than the scope of business, 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.5, 2015 
 
169 
the excess may be diverted to personal consumption, i.e., unproductive and in turn result in 
loan repayment default.  
 
7.3. LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
These study findings may not be used to generalize about the determinants of the MSEs group loan repayment 
performance because the study has focused on only the MSEs service sector and confined only to the Mekelle 
city.  The  study  has  only  throw  a  light  on the  factors that  determine  group  loan repayment  performance.  
Thus, comprehensive and comparative studies are recommended in order to have holistic picture on the MSEs 
group loan repayment performance by considering wide area and all the sectors such as construction, urban 
agriculture, and manufacturing, and trade. 
Within the service sector, there are many factors which are not considered in this study. Factors 
include group harmony, initial capital, loan frequency, interest rate, access to working premises, and 
infrastructure. Hence, more fruitful finding may be reached by taking the above mentioned factors in to 
consideration.   
Moreover, this study has employed chi-square test to test the association among the dependent and 
independent variables. Thus, further research may be conducted by considering optional statistical tools such as 
mean difference test (t-tests), correlation, and regression models.  
 
7.4. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
MFIs have immense contribution towards poverty reduction by creating employment opportunity especially in 
developing courtiers like Ethiopia. One of the key factors for profitability and sustainability of MFI is good loan 
repayment performance rate. Analyzing this loan repayment performance and setting appropriate solutions is 
essential to expand the activities of MFI in a sustainable manner.  
Thus, the study provides information for a better understanding on the determinants of loan repayment 
performance of DECSI and the primary advantage of this study is to establish a knowledge base that enables to 
makes a sound decision and take corrective action. In addition, the study will be useful for policy makers, other 
lending institutions and Stakeholders. Specially, the study benefits; 
 MFIs to have a clue about the association and effect of each explanatory factor on loan repayment 
performance. 
 Borrowers may get awareness on how to use and allocate loan in productive investment, i.e., it supports 
borrowers to be viable and feasible in their investment and pay their obligation. 
  MFIs will exist financially sound. 
 Finally, this study will have a contribution to academicians or researchers who will conduct their 
studies on similar areas. 
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